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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INACTION: MISAPPLICATION
OF THE FINALITY DOCTRINE-Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715
F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
A critical issue in administrative law is the reviewability of agency ac-
tion and inaction. I The issue of reviewability presents an important ques-
tion regarding the proper role of courts in relation to administrative agen-
cies. Courts must assure that administrative agencies fulfill their
regulatory duties and yet must be aware that premature judicial interven-
tion disrupts agency functions. The concern with premature judicial inter-
vention is the basis of the finality doctrine. 2 Under this doctrine, a court
has jurisdiction to review only final agency action. 3
In Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,4 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia addressed the reviewability of administrative inaction. The
court held it could exercise jurisdiction to review inaction on an issue
even though the agency insisted that the issue was still under study. 5 The
agency inaction involved in Sierra Club was the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA) failure to include strip mines on a list of pollutant
sources subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. 6 During the
1. The Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as APA] defines "agency action." It
states " 'agency action' includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982). The term
"agency action," therefore, includes every agency proceeding, action, and inaction.
On the subject of reviewability of agency action and inaction, see generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRArIvE LAw TREATISE, § 25 (2d ed. 1983); Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness Stan-
dards, Judicial Review of Agency Procedures, Procedural Reform and Legislative Oversight, 4 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 71 (1979); Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1423 (1968); Ogden, Judicial Control of Administrative Delay, 3 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1978);
Comment, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Inaction, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 627 (1983).
2. The terms reviewability, finality, ripeness, and exhaustion of remedies are often considered
interchangeable. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finality is a
question of ripeness); American Dairy of Evansville, Inc. v. Bergland, 627 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C.
Cir.) (1980) (finality and exhaustion are inextricably intertwined); 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 25:1
(ripeness overlaps reviewability and exhaustion). Although these doctrines are intertwined and are
designed to avoid premature intervention into agency proceedings, American Dairy, 627 F.2d at
1260-61, they are analytically different. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74 regarding ripeness
and finality.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 12-31. It is important to note that "final" inaction can take
two forms: (1) refusal to promulgate a regulation, i.e., when an agency concludes a study and states
that no regulation is forthcoming, see infra note 16; and (2) unreasonable delay in an agency process,
i.e., when an agency is still studying an issue and a challenge is made to the reasonableness of that
ongoing process. This second form of final inaction is discussed in this Note.
4. 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
5. Id. at 657.
6. The Clean Air Act establishes a rigorous program for the regulation of existing and new
sources of air pollution. The 1977 amendments to the Act contain provisions to "prevent significant
deterioration" [hereinafter referred to as PSD] of air quality when air quality does not meet the
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rulemaking process, the Sierra Club had urged that strip mines be in-
cluded on the list of pollutant sources based on an EPA-commissioned
study on the pollutant effects of the mines.7 When the EPA published the
list in final form, however, strip mines were omitted. The EPA did not
rebut or discuss the strip mine study in its statement accompanying the
published list.8
The Sierra Club petitioned the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
for review of the agency's inaction on the strip mine issue. The EPA
argued that it had not yet decided whether to regulate strip mines because
it lacked techniques for measuring pollution from individual mines. 9
Thus, the EPA argued, there was no "final" agency decision with respect
to strip mines, and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the omission of
strip mines from the list. 10 In a two-to-one decision, the court rejected
this argument. It directed the EPA to promptly consider the results of the
EPA-commissioned study and determine whether strip mines should be
added to the list of regulated sources. The EPA was to return to the court
with final action on the issue of strip mine regulation. I I
This Note first summarizes the finality doctrine, and then examines the
Sierra Club court's misapplication of the finality analysis. The Note sug-
gests an alternate analysis of the agency inaction in Sierra Club and pro-
poses that such an analysis be applied in factual situations similar to that
in Sierra Club.
I. THE FINALITY DOCTRINE
A court has jurisdiction to review only "final" agency action.' 2
statutory minimum. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1982). The PSD provisions apply only to "major
emitting facilities," which include sources that have the potential to emit 250 tons or more per year of
any air pollutant. Id. at § 7479(). For a thorough discussion of the Clean Air Act and its amend-
ments, see Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 346-55 (D.C. Cir 1979).
7. The EPA-commissioned study was known as the PEDCo Report. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY. REPORT No. 908-1-78-003. SURVEY OF FUGITIVE DUST FROM COAL MINES (1978).
According to the Sierra Club. the PEDCo Report indicated that most strip mines emit the 250-ton
threshold amount of pollutants, see supra note 6; Sierra Club. 715 F.2d at 660.
8. The Sierra Club court criticized the agency and industry intervenors for failing to discount the
Sierra Club's interpretation of the PEDCo Report that most strip mines would emit 250 tons of regu-
lated pollutants. 715 F.2d at 660. Though the agency did not discount the Sierra Club's interpretation.
the agency did provide a justification for its inaction-it lacked quantification techniques for applying
PSD regulations to individual mines. Id. at 659.
9. Id.
10. For purposes of its argument, the EPA relied on the jurisdictional statement in the Clean Air
Act. The Act vests jurisdiction in the court to review "final action" of the administrator, and action
of the administrator concerning nationally applicable regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)( 1) (1982).
II. The Sierra Club court stated that it expected 'final" action by the EPA within 90 days. 715
F.2d at 661 n.47.
12. This requirement is stated in the APA:
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The Misapplication of the Finality Doctrine
Assuming the issue is ripe and administrative remedies have been ex-
hausted, once a court finds the requisite finality it must decide whether the
agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 13 A key requirement of finality is
that the agency process must have reached a stage where judicial review
is not disruptive. 14 Courts have held agency action to be reviewable under
three separate doctrines. First, agency action is final, and thus review-
able, when the agency makes a definitive statement of its position on an
issue. 15 This usually occurs when an agency has concluded its study of a
particular issue and thereafter publishes a regulation indicating its posi-
tion. Agency action is also final when the agency states that it has con-
cluded its study of a particular issue and that no regulation on that issue is
forthcoming. 16
Second, agency action is constructively final, and therefore review-
able, when there has been an unreasonable delay in the administrative
process. 17 In this situation, the plaintiff must prove that the agency's de-
lay is so extreme as to be equivalent to a refusal to act and that, despite
the agency's assertion that it is still studying the issue, judicial interven-
Agency action made reviewable by statute and "final" agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or
intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of
the final agency action.
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). The finality requirement is also embodied in most jurisdictional statements in
statutes. See, e.g., supra note 10 regarding the jurisdictional statement in the Clean Air Act.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) (court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action which is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). This is the
appropriate standard for review of informal hearings unless otherwise required by statute. See Auto-
motive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
14. American Dairy of Evansville, Inc. v. Bergland, 627 F.2d 1552,1260 (D.C. Cir.) (1980).
15. Compare, FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239-41 (1980) (FTC's issuance of
complaint was not final agency action because complaint was not "definitive" statement of agency's
position) with Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151(1967) (FDA's publication of regula-
tions was final agency action because regulations were "clearly definitive" statements of the
agency's position).
16. See, e.g., National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court
reviewed FCC's decision not to adopt certain program standards for TV broadcasters); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court reviewed FCC's decision not to
adopt rules proposed by public interest group to improve children's television).
17. The APA requires administrative agencies to complete actions "within a reasonable time," 5
U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 558(c) (1982) and authorizes courts to compel agency action "unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed." Id. § 706(1) (1982). A finding of "final" agency action based on unrea-
sonable delay requires three steps. First, a court must define what is a delayed or abnormal time
period for the agency's action. Second, the court must determine whether the objecting party has
been prejudiced by the delayed action. Finally, a court must ascertain whether the agency's justifica-
tions for delay are sufficient to preclude judicial intervention at that time. Ogden, Judicial Control of
Administrative Delay, supra note I, at 357.
After concluding there is an unreasonable delay, a court may employ a variety of remedies: the
court can impose a timetable on the agency, remand the issue and require the agency to decide the
issue promptly, or order the agency to enter the delayed decision. Id. at 376-82.
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tion is appropriate. Factors that have led courts to find a delay unreason-
able are an imminent threat to public health,' 8 a significant time lapse,' 9
and the expiration of a statutory timetable. 20
Third, the Supreme Court has adopted a pragmatic, case-by-case ap-
proach to determine when agency action is reviewable. This pragmatic
approach, first developed in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,2' uses a
balancing approach and considers the "fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court considera-
tion." 22 Courts have made clear that even under this "pragmatic ap-
proach" judicial intervention in incomplete administrative proceedings
must remain the exception and not the rule. 23
This pragmatic approach incorporates the finality doctrine by requiring
that agency action be fit for review. Courts decide whether issues are fit
for review on a case-by-case basis.2 4 The main focus of the pragmatic
approach, however, is on "ripeness" rather than "finality." 25 Though
courts often use the terms interchangeably, there is a difference between
the doctrines. The ripeness requirement is a self-imposed limitation,
focusing on whether judicial interference is desirable, whereas finality is
a jurisdictional prerequisite. 26
Courts have given several justifications for the finality doctrine. First,
it conserves judicial resources. By withholding judicial review until final
agency action, a court may avoid needless intervention because the
18. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter. 702 F.2d 1150, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("[dielays that might be altogether reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable
when human lives are at stake"): Environmental Defense Fund. Inc. v. Hardin. 428 F.2d 1093. 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (agency had less discretion to control decision timetable on suspension of DDT
because of threat of an "imminent hazard").
19. See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (nine years is an adequate period for
any agency to decide almost any issue.) But see FTC v. Weingarten. Inc.. 336 F.2d 687, 692 (5th
Cir. 1964) (unreasonable delay cannot be established by the mere passage of time). cert. denied. 380
U.S. 908 (1965).
20. Caswell v. Califano. 583 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1978). In Caswell, the court held there was an
unreasonable delay because the agency had not made welfare benefit decisions within a 90-day time
period. The court defined 90 days as a "reasonable" time by relying on an analogous provision in the
Social Security Act. Id. at 17.
21. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In Abbott. manufacturers of prescription drugs challenged regulations
promulgated to implement an amendment to the Federal Food. Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 137.
Although the regulations had not been enforced against any manufacturers, the Court held that the
regulations were reviewable. The Court concluded that the issue was both "final" and "ripe" for
review. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149-51.
22. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149.
23. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States Dept. of Energy. 663 F.2d 296, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(quoting Nader v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261. 268 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
25. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 148 (discussing the pragmatic test as one of "ripeness").
26. See supra notes 10 and 12, discussing jurisdictional nature of finality.
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complainant may succeed in the administrative process. 27 Even if the
complainant is not successful in the agency process, "final" agency ac-
tion provides for more simplified and focused issues, which expedites re-
view. 28
Judicial nonintervention also permits the agency the opportunity to cor-
rect its own mistakes and apply its expertise. 29 Administrative agencies
are created to deal with complex social problems and are equipped with
specialized staff to accomplish this goal. Finally, the finality requirement
preserves the stature and continuing effectiveness of an agency. 30 If fi-
nality were not required, complainants would be encouraged to ignore
agency procedures and immediately turn to the courts for redress. 31 Thus,
the doctrine acknowledges trust in administrative agencies to solve a
problem and to solve it properly.
II. THE SIERRA CLUB COURT'S REASONING
In Sierra Club, the court acknowledged the EPA's claim that the issue
of strip mines was still under study. 32 The court, however, exercised ju-
risdiction on the basis of "final" agency action. 33 The court reasoned: (1)
the EPA conducted rulemaking in which strip mines were in issue; (2)
thereafter, the EPA promulgated regulations, consisting of a list of pollu-
tant sources which would be subject to regulation under the Clean Air
Act; (3) this list of regulated sources became "final" when published in
the Federal Register; and (4) the Sierra Club challenged the EPA's list of
sources "as promulgated." 34
Because the Sierra Club challenged the list "as promulgated," the
court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the strip mine issue be-
cause strip mines were not included on this "final" list of regulated pollu-
tion sources. 35 Thus, the court found the requisite finality to review the
strip mine issue by focusing on whether there was some regulation
27. See FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (intervention "leads to piecemeal review
which at the least is inefficient and upon completion of the agency process might prove to have been
unnecessary."); see also McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971) (same under exhaustion
of remedies analysis).
28. See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 1, at x25:11 ("[n]o court should decide an issue that has not been
properly clarified").
29. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 242.
30. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969) (expressing same principles with respect
to the exhaustion doctrine).
31. Id.
32. 715 F.2d at 658.
33. Id. at 657.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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promulgated by the EPA as a result of a decisionmaking process in which
strip mines were an issue, rather than focusing on whether the strip mine
issue was final. The court used a semantic argument rather than logical
analysis of the challenged issue, strip mine regulation, to find the required
finality to assume jurisdiction.
The Sierra Club court stated that the EPA's contention that final action
had not been taken did not affect its jurisdiction but did affect its standard
of review. 36 The court limited its review to examining the agency's rea-
sons for the deferred action.37 The court did not accept the EPA's "lack
of quantification techniques" justification for not including strip mines on
the published list of pollutant sources. Nevertheless, the court was
unwilling to determine whether the EPA had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously.3 8 Instead, it remanded the record for reconsideration by the EPA
regarding whether strip mines should be included in the list of pollutant
sources regulated by the Clean Air Act.
The dissent argued that the appropriate analysis was whether there was
an unreasonable delay by the EPA, given the EPA's justifications.3 9 Us-
ing this analysis, the dissent believed the delay in regulating strip mines
was reasonable. 40
III. ANALYSIS
The Sierra Club court misapplied the finality doctrine to the EPA's
inaction on the strip mine issue. The court used the Abbott pragmatic ap-
proach4 1 to review the agency inaction but did not apply it properly. This
led to inconsistencies in the court's opinion and resulted in an unwar-
ranted judicial intrusion into the agency's decisionmaking process. The
Sierra Club court could have better analyzed the EPA's inaction by using
an unreasonable delay analysis instead of the Abbott pragmatic approach.
The Sierra Club court based its jurisdiction on "final" agency ac-
tion. 42 Final agency action can be based on an agency's definitive posi-
tion on an issue or an unreasonable delay. Furthermore, pragmatic con-
siderations may justify review. 43 The court acknowledged that the EPA
had not taken a definitive position on the strip mine issue. 44 It also stated
36. Id. at 658.
37. Id. at 659.
38. Id. at 661.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 662.
41. Id. at 657.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
44. 715 F.2d at 658.
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that the question of unreasonable delay was not properly before it.45
Therefore, the only possible justification for the court's assumption of
jurisdiction is that it applied the pragmatic approach to review of the
EPA's inaction. 46
The pragmatic approach is a case-by-case method with a two prong
test. 47 A court must first evaluate the "fitness" of the issue for judicial
decision. Second, the court must consider the hardship to the parties of
withholding court evaluation, and the degree of interference with the
agency's decisionmaking process. 48 The Sierra Club court failed to prop-
erly consider these elements.
A. The First Prong-Fitness of the Issue for Judicial Resolution
Courts determine whether an issue is fit for review by using a case-by-
case analysis. The Supreme Court found Abbott fit for judicial resolution
because the disputed issue was a purely legal one. 49 However, in a com-
panion case to Abbott, Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner,50 the Court
determined that merely framing an issue to present a legal question did
not make the issue fit for review. 51 Rather, the court indicated that fitness
involves an evaluation of many factors, such as whether adequate specific
information is before the court, and whether the court can adequately deal
with the legal issue.52
The Sierra Club court did attempt to comply with Abbott by phrasing
the issue in terms of a legal question: Given the agency's criteria for plac-
ing a pollutant source on the list, should strip mines have been
45. See id. at 657 n.29. The Sierra Club argued that the court should treat the EPA's delay as
equivalent to a decision not to regulate and therefore subject to review. The court, however, rejected
this theory because the Sierra Club had no "new evidence" to present to the EPA. Id. The court took
a very narrow view of the word "delay." The court suggested there was no delay by the EPA because
it was not conducting any rulemaking on strip mines at the time. The court's analysis is confusing
because unreasonable delay is often found when an agency has done nothing.
46. The Sierra Club court stated that the "requirement of finality is in essence a question of
ripeness, focusing on the appropriateness of the issues presented for judicial review." 715 F.2d at
657. The court then referred to the Abbott pragmatic approach. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
48. The Sierra Club court discussed the Abbott pragmatic approach as involving only an analysis
of fitness and hardship. However, consideration of the degree of interference which will result from
judicial intervention has always been an underlying factor. See Standard Oil. 449 U.S. at 243 (1980).
49. In a brief analysis of fitness, the Court concluded the issue was a legal one: whether the FDA
amendment was properly construed by the agency. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149: see supra note 21 for the
facts of Abbott.
50. 387 U.S. 158 (1967). In Toilet Goods, cosmetic manufacturers brought suit on the ground that
regulations promulgated were beyond the agency's power under the statute; the Court held that the
issue was not reviewable because it was not ripe. Id. at 159-64.
51. Id. at 163.
52. Seeid.at164.
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included? 53 As the Court in Toilet Goods stated, however, mere phrasing
of the issue in terms of a legal question is insufficient to make an issue fit
for review. In Sierra Club, there was persuasive evidence that the issue
was not fit for review.
First, the Sierra Club court did not even analyze the "fitness" of the
issue of including strip mines on the EPA's list. Instead, it focused on the
fitness of challenging the promulgated regulations which listed pollutants
that the EPA had decided to regulate. 54 The court failed to differentiate
between fitness with respect to the promulgated regulations, which was
not an issue, and fitness with respect to the noninclusion of strip mines.
which was an issue. The EPA had taken a definitive position on regulat-
ing certain pollutants. Because that issue would have been fit, the court
would have had jurisdiction to review a challenge to the regulation of one
of those pollutants. The court also would have had jurisdiction to review
the strip mine issue if the EPA had announced it would definitely not
regulate strip mines. Because the EPA was still studying it, however, the
issue of whether the EPA would include strip mines on its list was not fit
and the court did not have jurisdiction for review.
The Sierra Club court's admission that it could not review the strip
mine issue because of an inadequate record55 further shows that the issue
was not fit for review. After a court finds an issue reviewable, it decides
whether the agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 56 If the strip
mine issue had been reviewable, the court's alternatives would have been
either to uphold the EPA's omission of strip mines from the regulation as
a valid decision or to order the regulation of strip mines because the omis-
sion was arbitrary and capricious. 57 The Sierra Club court did neither. It
could only remand the case and "anticipate" final action within ninety
days. 58
B. The Second Prong-Hardship to the Parties and Degree of
Inteiference
Hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review falls within the
second prong of the pragmatic approach. The hardship inquiry also
requires a case-by-case analysis. Courts generally require a showing of
53. 715 F.2d at 657.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
55. 715 F.2d at 661.
56. With respect to the Clean Air Act, the standard of review is set forth in § 307(d)(9). 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(At (1982). It is the same standard as that set forth in the APA. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1982).
57. See supra note 13.
58. 715 F.2d at 661 n.47.
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irreparable harm. 59 The hardship requirement has been met where: (1)
regulations forced persons to "risk serious criminal and civil penalties"
for noncompliance; 60 and (2) public health and safety were threatened by
imminent exposure to harmful chemicals. 61
In Sierra Club, the petitioners failed to show that "irreparable harm"
would result if the court withheld review. At most, the petitioners could
show that one study, the PEDCo Report, indicated that small strip mines,
and presumably larger ones, surpassed the Clean Air Act's 250-ton
threshold requirement for regulation. 62 Furthermore, the petitioners
agreed with the agency's and intervenor's position that only respirable
particles are harmful, and that strip mine emissions consist mainly of
larger particles. 63
The Sierra Club court's only justification for not properly applying the
hardship requirement was that it feared that the EPA was seeking to es-
cape judicial review by insisting that the strip mine issue was still under
study.6a The court substituted this suspicion for the hardship requirement.
It supported this position by relying on Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus.65 That case, however, can be distinquished from Si-
erra Club. In EDF v. Ruckelshaus, though the court stated that it would
not allow an agency to escape review by delaying its determination in-
definitely, the hardship requirement was met because there was an immi-
nent threat to public health. 66 Thus, imminent threat to public health cou-
pled with a court's suspicion that the agency is avoiding review may be a
sufficient basis for review. The court in EDF v. Ruckelshaus did not,
however, suggest that suspicion alone is sufficient to justify review.
The pragmatic approach also considers the degree with which judicial
intervention will interfere with the proper functioning of an agency.
In Sierra Club, several factors indicate that the court's decision was a
59. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (not reviewable be-
cause no irreparable injury); Toilet Goods, 387 U.S. at 164-65 (not reviewable because no irremedi-
able adverse consequences).
60. Abbott, 387 U.S. 137, 153 (regulation requires an immediate and significant change in plain-
tiffs' affairs, with serious penalties attached to noncompliance).
61. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(court had jurisdiction to review agency action where record indicated persons were probably subject
to grave danger from exposure to chemicals); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439
F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court had jurisdiction to review agency action where record indicated that
there was an imminent threat to public health as a result of the use of DDT).
62. Sierra Club, 715 F.2d at 659.
63. Id. at 660 n.44. The Sierra Club did argue, however, that many mines' respirable pollution
exceeded the 250 ton limit. Id.
64. "Judicial review of decisions not to regulate must not be frustrated by blind acceptance of an
agency's claim that a decision is still understudy." Id. at 659 (emphasis in original).
65. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. Id. at 592.
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significant interference with the EPA's functioning. First, though the
court did not rule on the substantive issue of strip mine regulation, it did
interfere with the agency's decisionmaking process by ordering the
agency to decide the issue in ninety days. Second, the stature of the EPA
was affected. The Sierra Club court implied distrust of the EPA and, as a
result of the court's unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, environmen-
tal groups will be prompted to circumvent the agency process. Petitioners
will be encouraged not to wait for the agency's final decision but to seek
redress in the courts as the Sierra Club did.
In sum, the Sierra Club court failed to properly apply the pragmatic
approach to review. It also failed to adequately consider the impact of
judicial review on the agency's process. Though the court did not carry its
finding of jurisdiction to a logical conclusion, 67 the case is important be-
cause a logical extension of the court's analysis would be to order the
EPA to regulate strip mines. Thus, the decision may result in unwarranted
substitutions of the courts' judgment for an agency's judgment. 68
IV. AN UNREASONABLE DELAY ANALYSIS
The Sierra Club court should have analyzed the EPA's inaction by us-
ing an unreasonable delay analysis, 69 which is the established method for
determining when inaction is sufficiently final to warrant review. 7a The
pragmatic approach, if applied correctly, could be an adequate analysis
for review of agency inaction. The unreasonable delay analysis is prefer-
able, however, for two reasons. First, it focuses more specifically on the
issue of "finality of inaction." If the Sierra Club court had applied an
unreasonable delay analysis, it would have had to focus on the relevant
issue-inaction on the issue of strip mine regulation-rather than using a
semantic argument.
Second, an unreasonable delay analysis is considered a "finality," and
67. See supra text accompanying notes 38 and 57.
68. A court may substitute its judgment for the agency's in some instances. For example. when
there is final agency action, a court may hold that the agency's action was arbitrary and strike the
regulation. This is appropriate because the court is fulfilling its supervisory role of assuring that
agencies meet their regulatory duties. It is inappropriate, however, for a court to substitute its judg-
ment for the agency's at intermediate stages in the agency process. The agency. like a trial court.
applies a statute in the first instance. A court, therefore, is not assuming a proper role when it reviews
agency action that is not final. If an agency is not acting fast enough, deadlines should be imposed by
Congress, not the courts.
69. For a discussion of the unreasonable delay analysis, see supra note 17.
70. Most courts when confronted with a challenge to agency inaction have used an unreasonable
delay analysis. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983):
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth.. 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977): Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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therefore a jurisdictional, determination. In contrast, a "ripeness" ap-
proach focuses more on the desirability of court review. The Sierra Club
court stated that the determination of finality is in essence a question of
ripeness. 71 Ripeness and finality, though they overlap, should be ana-
lyzed separately. While agency action may be final, it will not necessarily
be ripe.72 Whether the agency action is sufficiently final is the first deter-
mination, whether it is ripe for review is a second, independent determi-
nation. If the Sierra Club court had emphasized the jurisdictional issue
involved rather than its suspicion, it would not have interfered with the
EPA as it did.
The decision in Abbott demonstrates the distinction between ripeness
and finality. In Abbott, the agency had made a definitive statement of its
position on the challenged issue. The relevant question was whether judi-
cial review was appropriate when the agency had not enforced the regula-
tion against the petitioner. 73 Finality was not an issue because the agency
had concluded its studies and rulemaking with respect to the challenged
issue. In Abbott, the true question was ripeness. 74
It is possible that the Sierra Club court was attempting to apply an un-
reasonable delay analysis. If so, the court's analysis is ambiguous be-
cause it discussed unreasonable delay in its analysis of the "scope of re-
view" rather than in its analysis of jurisdiction. 75 An unreasonable delay
analysis is a basis for concluding that a court has jurisdiction. The ques-
tion of unreasonable delay, therefore, was moot after the Sierra Club
court had found it could review by using the Abbott pragmatic test. The
result in Sierra Club is, however, more consistent with an unreasonable
delay analysis. Once a court finds an unreasonable delay, it can do what
the Sierra Club court did: remand to the agency for prompt considera-
tion. 76
If the Sierra Club court had used an unreasonable delay analysis, it
would have required the Sierra Club to prove that the EPA's delay in
regulating strip mines was so extreme as to be equivalent to a refusal to
71. 715 F.2d at 657.
72. For example, in Toilet Goods, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 50-52, the Court
stated that though the regulation being challenged was final, it was not ripe for review. 387 U.S. at
162 (no question that it is "final agency action").
73. 387U.S.at146.
74. There is a definite overlap between the Abbott pragmatic test and the unreasonable delay
analysis: the Abbott approach is primarily concerned with irremediable harm, see supra text accom-
panying note 59, and the unreasonable delay analysis is primarily concerned with threat to public
health and safety, see supra note 18. In fact, therefore, both tests have "hardship" as an important
element.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
76. See supra note 17 regarding the remedies a court may employ after finding there has been an
unreasonable delay in agency action.
1003
Washington Law Review
act. The Sierra Club could have argued that the period of time since the
EPA regulated other pollutants77 evidenced a refusal to act in regulating
strip mines. The Sierra Club also could have argued that the absence of
strip mine regulation created an imminent threat to public health. 78 Even
applying the unreasonable delay analysis, however, the Sierra Club court
probably would not have had jurisdiction because the EPA's justification
for not regulating strip mines at the time 79 made the delay a reasonable
one. 80
V. CONCLUSION
The Sierra Club court misapplied the finality doctrine to agency inac-
tion. The court was suspicious of the agency's inaction and wanted to
assume jurisdiction. The court, however, recognized that an order to the
agency to regulate strip mines would be an invasion of the agency's au-
thority. To assume jurisdiction, therefore, the court used the Abbott
pragmatic approach combined with a semantic argument of finality. If the
court had used an unreasonable a-lay analysis, it would have focused on
the proper issue: Had the EPA so unreasonably delayed regulating strip
mines as to have made a final agency action, which would warrant re-
view? This would have led to a more logical analysis and conclusion by
the Sierra Club court.
Jacqualee Story
77. The time lapse since the promulgation of regulations for other pollutants was over It months.
Sierra Club, 715 F.2d at 661.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
79. See supra note 8 (explains the EPA's justification for not regulating strip mines).
80. See Sierra Club. 715 F.2d at 662 (MacKinnon, J.. dissenting).
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